We view observational causal induction as a statistical independence test under rarity assumption. This paper complements the two-stage theory of causal induction proposed by Hattori and Oaksford (2007) with a computational analysis.
as the square root of the index of (non-)independence under extreme rarity assumption, contrary to the criticism that the DFH model is non-normative (e.g., Lu et al., 2008) . We introduce a model that considers the proportion of assumed-to-be rare instances (pARIs), which is the probability of biconditionals (according to several theories of compound conditionals) and can be seen as a simplified version of the DFH model. While being a single conditional probability, pARIs approximates the non-independence measure, the square of DFH. In reproducing the meta-analysis in Hattori and Oaksford (2007) , we confirm that pARIs and DFH have the same level of descriptive adequacy, and that the two models have the highest fit among more than 40 models. Then, we critically examine the computer simulations which were central to the rational analysis in Hattori and Oaksford (2007) . We point out two problems in their simluations: samples in some of the simulations being restricted to generative ones, and indefinite values of models because of the small samples. In the light of especially effect pairs. From pure observation, especially only with co-occurrence, it is 48 usually impossible to distinguish between correlation and causation. However, in Because of the abundance of events, together with limits to mental compu-55 tation, spatio-temporal observation scope and working memory, it is rational 56 The experimental and modelling framework of causal induction for this study 67 is that agents form the causal strength from C to E based on the four frequencies 68 in Table 1 . E is the effect in focus and C is a candidate cause of E. We also 69 assume that the models have the type of function with the domain of four natural 75 φ = P (C, E)P (¬C, ¬E) − P (C, ¬E)P (¬C, E) P (C)P (¬C)P (E)P (¬E) .
The most representative model of causal induction is ∆P (Jenkins and Ward, 76 1965):
which is the increase in the probability of E caused by the presence of C relative 78 to C's absence. This model formalises the basic idea of scientific experiments.
79
For example, the first term, P (E|C), represents the test group whereas the 80 second term, P (E|¬C), represents the control group. ∆P is the regression 81 slope from C to E, letting Cheng and Holyoak, 2008).
90
DFH was introduced as a descriptive model, which is the geometric mean
91
of the 'predictability' of effect from cause P (E|C) and its converse, the 'diag-92 nosability' of cause from effect P (C|E), predicting that humans feel the strong 93 causality only when both are high:
DFH showed the highest correlation with the data among models in the meta- 
The limit operation is called an extreme rarity assumption; it neglects the 100 assumed-to-be very abundant N (¬C, ¬E)-cell information.
101
Takahashi et al. (2010) have proposed the pARIs model, which is similar in 102 some ways to DFH, but simpler:
This model was named in reference to the proportion of confirmatory instances
104
(pCI) model, proposed by White (2003) , which is defined as:
pARIs and pCI are conceptually different in that pARIs is a conditional prob-106 ability and pCI is not (except in a trivial sense). Instead of the limit operation 107 used in deriving DFH from φ, pARIs is based on the conditioning on the cases 108 in which either C or E (or both) occurred. When events C and E are rare,
109
among joint events between them, the three joint events, C ∧ E, C ∧ ¬E and
110
¬C ∧ E are rarer than the joint absence ¬C ∧ ¬E. If C and E are statistically independent and P (C) and P (E) are non-zero,
132
the following three terms are equal:
In terms of frequency, Eq. 13 is
The derivation of DFH is based on an extreme rarity assumption represented 
holds, which means that P (C|E)P (E|C) is the limiting case of the coefficient of 145 determination on the 2×2 Under extreme rarity, an index should take a certain value when C and E
154
are independent, and its antipodal value when C and E are not independent,
155
as discussed concerning Eq. 14. In this regard, when C and E are independent
156
(see Eq. 13),
which implies that if P (C) and P (E) are both small (large), it goes to 0 (1).
158
Also,
under independence, and shows a similar property to pARIs indep . We can 160 also see that pARIs and DFH are 0 and 1 when P (E|C) = P (C|E) = 0 and 161 P (E|C) = P (C|E) = 1, respectively. The difference in the behaviour of pARIs 162 and that of DFH is how they connect the two extreme values, 0 and 1. It holds 163 that pARIs ≤ DFH, because letting U = max{(P (C), P (E)}, P (C)P (E) ≤ U 2 164 and hence, P (C)P (E) ≤ U . From Eqs. 6 and 10:
This means that pARIs is more prudent or conservative than DFH in that it 
Meta-analysis

169
To compare the fit of the models introduced in the previous section, we re- 
186
To measure each index's fit to the data, we calculated the coefficient of correla-187 tion (r) between each index and participants' mean ratings of causal strength.
188
Among the eight experiments included, AS95 differs from others in some has a specific set of conditions. Therefore, we calculated the overall data fit 203 with and without AS95, as shown in Table 2 . Table 3 ). We guess that the latter was excluded because the stimulus was not strictly generative. that is, how similarly it behaves to φ (the correlation coefficient of the sample). Here, we just point out two implicit problems in the original simulations. i.e. P (C, E) ≥ P (C)P (E)) rather than preventive (C and E are negatively Politzer, 2013). Still, sample sizes as small as 7 ± 2 is a realistic condition that people can deal with only a smaller number of frequencies because of a temporal rather than memory limit, where we usually make an action as soon as possible, in addition to the memory limitation.
ory and model. The problem is that the contingency tables used for calcu-lating and evaluating the indices are limited to generative ones, i.e., where preventive tables are included, when P (C) and P (E) are not small. Seemingly,
283
it does not affect the interpretations of the original result that focus on the cases 284 in which P (C) and P (E) are both small, but further investigation is needed. 
294
We analyse the 'definability' of the models, especially because we deal with 295 very small samples that model the quite limited capacity of our working memory,
296
and we often do not have sufficient time to gather data, nor to wait for more 297 occurrences. The models have different definability, as summarised in 
or positive-are considered. In the eight cases, min N ≤ 4 and min N W ≤ 3.
300
As for the four indices φ, ∆P , DFH and pARIs, the more complicated the index 301 is, the fewer cases it is defined for. φ, ∆P , DFH and pARIs have 5, 6, 5 and 7 302 definable cases, respectively. pARIs is defined simply whenever N W ≥ 1. DFH 303 is defined when min N W ≥ 2 or N (C, E) ≥ 1. A sufficient condition for φ and
304
∆P to be defined is min N ≥ 3. 
308
A valid comparison would be to say one model is better than another only when 309 the former is defined on strictly more cases than the latter and still performs 310 better.
311
In Simulation A ( is small (around N = 7), a large part of the contingency tables with small 314 P (C) and P (E) do not define φ: only Cases 4-8 in Table 3 do. It discounts 315 the meaningfulness of Simulation A in terms of small samples, and this is a heavy condition to impose on the tables when N or N W is so small such as 317 N ∼ N (7, 1 2 ), especially when we assume that P (C) and P (E) are both small.
318
We calculated the proportion of tables generated in Simulation A on which
319
DFH is defined, which were around 35% and 65% of the sampled tables when 320 P (C) = P (E) = .1 and P (C) = P (E) = .2, respectively. pARIs is defined on 321 around 62% and 86% of the tables, respectively, which means that pARIs faces 322 this problem strictly less than DFH.
323
This condition of φ being definable is also imposed on Simulation B, although 324 it is not necessary in this simulation setting because φ 0 is the measure to be 
335
The percentages of the samples on which pARIs can be defined are 20%-40%
336
at N = 1 and 100% at N W = 1, and a strict order relation holds with DFH, as
337
we can see in and if effect then cause'). DFH represents both conditionals as the geometric 348 mean of P (E|C) and P (C|E), and pARIs directly uses the probability of the 349 biconditional: and/or engine starting (N (¬C, ¬E) := N (C ∨ E) − 1), or we might want to say 371 we have never observed such an event.
372
The count of N (¬C, ¬E) depends on the spatio-temporal framing of events.
373
A more definite framing than the examples above is the division of a day into 374 144 ten-minute intervals and the identification of occurrences of C and E. Or
375
we can count the occurrence of times when a driver enters a car, turns the 376 key, and then exits the car after we observe the effect. In this way, ¬C ∧ ¬E 377 cases can be made definite, although there are many ways to frame it. In our 378 everyday causal judgment, it would be quite rare for framing to be rigorous and 
Causal induction models in terms of conditionals
396
We compare the three models pARIs, DFH and ∆P , in terms of their use 397 of conditionals, based on the fact that the subjective probability of a causal 398 conditional 'if C, then E' is well described by the conditional probability P (E|C)
399
(e.g., see Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley and Sloman (2007), but also see , 2000) . However, the latter probability vanishes under extreme rarity.
405
In pARIs and DFH, the converse ('if effect then cause', P (C|E)) is used as a are atomic and that they correspond to conditional events (de Finetti, 1964 and it is problematic for pARIs that it cannot express such negative probabilistic dependency.
We think the comment might in principle extend to criticism of the framework of the present computational analysis, but we try to answer it approximately within the framework, from two aspects. First, Hattori and Oaksford (2007) discussed DFH (and hence pARIs) can deal with the negative probabilistic dependencies, or preventive causes, by transforming 'C prevents E' into '¬C causes E', swapping the two rows on the contingency table. While Lu et al. (2008) criticized the idea, there is no empirical test done so far. Second, under the assumptions of our analysis, the goal is to compute the non-independence of C and E that is unipolar (nonnegative). Also, as discussed in 6.2, under the assumptions, the second term of ∆P vanishes and merely ∆P = P (E|C). Even outside the assumptions, as discussed in 6.1, the value of 
